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ALTERNATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION OF
CONDOMINIUM AND COOPERATIVE
CONFLICTS
SCOTT E. MOLLEN"
Many experienced practitioners and jurists believe that after
relationships involving love and/or sex, the next most passionate
relationship in our society is that of landlord-tenant and its re-
lated configurations, i.e. condominium unit owner/condominium
("condo") board of directors and cooperative ("co-op") share-
holder/co-op board (collectively referred to hereinafter as
"occupancy relationships").' Conflicts arising from "occupancy
relationships" ("occupancy conflicts") often evoke emotions of ex-
treme hostility, bitterness and frustration. Many parties to such
disputes erupt into diatribes of emotionally charged words which
exponentially expand and intensify the conflict. The printable
vocabulary of occupancy conflicts often includes words like
'livid," "vicious," "revenge," "fraud," "arrogant," "pompous,"
"power crazy," "breach of fiduciary duty," "self-dealing,"
"favoritism," "insensitive," "litigious," "stupid," and
"troublemaker." Not only are occupancy conflicts extremely in-
tense, but they are propagating with alarming rapidity.
It has been reported that during the months of February,
March, and April of 1997, in just three of the boroughs of New
York City (Brooklyn, Queens, and Manhattan), co-op corpora-
tions or condo associations ("associations"), were involved in
4,328 Housing Court litigations.2 Such a statistic is only the tip
" The Author is a partner in the law firm of Graubard, Mollen & Miller, a mem-
ber of the Mayor's Advisory Committee on the Judiciary, author of the weekly Re-
alty Law Digest column in the New York Law Journal, a member of the Board of
Editors of the New York Law Journal, and an adjunct professor who teaches Alter-
nate Dispute Resolution at St. John's University School of Law.
1The principal problems and issues discussed herein are also generally appli-
cable to homeowner associations.
2 See Jay Romano, Co-op Cases are Getting Own Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26,
1997, sec. 11, at 3 (discussing plans to create a part in the housing court solely for
condominium and co-op disputes).
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of a massive iceberg because it excludes Housing Court litigation
in the populous borough of the Bronx and the condominium
laden borough of Staten Island. This statistic also excludes su-
preme court actions in all five boroughs, actions in the United
States District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of
New York, disputes pending before alternate dispute resolution
organizations such as the American Arbitration Association,
JAMS Endispute, National Arbitration & Mediation (NAM), and
disputes that are gestating in the dialogue and negotiation
phases.
The Housing Court litigation statistic provides only a hint as
to the enormous resources, public and private, that are con-
sumed by such litigation. Given the intense and hostile nature
of these conflicts, occupancy litigation commonly involves pro-
lific, expensive, and wasteful motion practice.' Parties to such
disputes often make motions to punish for civil and/or criminal
contempt and/or for sanctions.4 Opposing parties also tend to
3 In New York, landlords commonly make motions; such as a motion seeking
immediate possession of leased premises, a motion seeking to compel payment of
rent and other charges, a motion to obtain a levy on the tenant's household goods, a
motion for relief from a stay to pursue eviction, and a motion for a protective order.
See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW art. 7 (McKinney 1979 & Supp. 1999). New York
tenants commonly make motions to obtain orders requiring landlords to release
tenants' belongings, for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the landlord from evicting
the tenant, for dismissal of non-payment and holdover proceedings based upon lack
of proper service or a defective notice or pleading and for immediate repair of defec-
tive conditions. See Scott E. Mollen, Legal Fees of $336,000 Awarded Following a
$44,000 Judgment-Co-Op was Compelled to Wage Expensive Fight Against Skilled
Attorney, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 20, 1996, at 5 (discussing a court award of $336,000 in at-
torneys fees in an occupancy conflict); see also Ansonia Assoc. v. N.Y.S. Div. of Hous.
& Comm. Renewal, 599 N.Y.S.2d 275 (App. Div. 1993); Ansonia Assoc. v. Ansonia
Tenants' Coalition, Inc., 566 N.Y.S.2d 637 (App. Div. 1991); Ansonia Assoc. v. N.Y.S.
Div, of Hous. & Comm. Renewal, 550 N.Y.S.2d 328 (App. Div. 1990); Ansonia Assoc.
v. N.Y.S. Div. of Hous. & Comm. Renewal, 504 N.Y.S.2d 421 (App. Div. 1986); An-
sonia Assoc. v. Ansonia Residents' Assoc., 434 N.Y.S.2d 370 (App. Div. 1980); An-
sonia Tenants' Coalition, Inc. v. Ansonia Assoc., 573 N.Y.S.2d 211 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
The Ansonia decisions provide a classic illustration of an extremely expensive, pro-
tracted and contentious occupancy conflict.
4 New York has strict housing code standards and statutes which are enforced
through the use of civil or criminal sanctions. See Minjak Co. v. Randolph, 528
N.Y.S.2d 554, 557 (App. Div. 1988). In Minjak Co., the court held that "it is within
the public interest to deter conduct which undermines those standards when that
conduct rises to the level of high moral culpability or indifference to a landlord's civil
obligations." Id. at 558. Consequently, a court may order punitive damages in
breach of warranty of habitability cases. See id. Other examples of criminal and civil
sanctions may result from failure to cure a housing violation. See, e.g., N.Y. MULT.
DWELL. LAW § 304 (McKinney 1974 & Supp. 1999); Department of Hous. Preserva-
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engage in fierce battles over pre-trial discovery.' Moreover, ag-
grieved occupants will often attempt to invoke the assistance of
government agencies6 and local elected officials. Some aggrieved
occupants will even seek local news media coverage of their dis-
putes.
Bar associations, industry and occupant organizations, state
regulators, and legislators throughout our country are studying,
debating, and proposing possible strategies for effectively dealing
with the rising tide of occupancy conflicts. Since the prolifera-
tion of occupancy conflicts has been national in scope, it cannot
be fairly ascribed to the stereotypical pugnacious New York per-
sonality.
For the many reasons discussed herein, knowledgeable pro-
fessionals, regulators, legislators, owners, sponsors, and occu-
pants are increasingly concluding that certain forms of Alternate
Dispute Resolution ("ADR") can be extremely effective in resolv-
ing occupancy conflicts in a timely and cost effective manner.
Moreover, many experts have concluded that employment of
ADR procedures enhances the likelihood that the disputants will
view the ADR process end result as equitable and just.7
I. GROWTH OF CONDOMINIUM AND COOPERATIVE OWNERSHIP
A number of factors have fueled the growth of the condo and
co-op form of ownership, as well as other forms of common inter-
tion & Dev. v. Deka Realty Corp., 620 N.Y.S.2d 837, 845-46 (App. Div. 1995) (up-
holding an assessment of criminal and civil contempt fines and penalties against a
landlord who failed to correct housing code violations and remanding the case for a
redetermination of the amount).
r See, e.g., American Realty Co. v. 64 B Venture, 574 N.Y.S.2d 344, 346 (App.
Div. 1991) (refusing to grant a counterclaim defendant pre-trial discovery and call-
ing it a "fishing expedition").
6 For example, in New York City, aggrieved occupants have attempted to enlist
the assistance of, inter alia, the City Department of Housing Preservation and De-
velopment, the City Department of Buildings, the City Fire Department, the City's
Landmarks Commission, the Real Estate Financing Bureau of the State Attorney
General's office, and the State Division of Housing and Community Renewal.
7While use of an ADR process will often yield a timely and cost effective result
and participant satisfaction that is greater than that attainable through litigation,
ADR may not be appropriate for every party or every situation. For example, there
are occasions when parties will benefit by establishing a judicial precedent or by
delaying a resolution. Some parties may believe that because of their larger litiga-
tion war chest, they are more likely to achieve their desired result through expen-
sive and protracted delay, i.e. uneven economic circumstances may make litigation a
preferable process. See generally Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J.
1073, 1085 (1984) (advocating the advantages of the judicial process over ADR).
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est developments.8 As urban areas grow, residential, commer-
cial, and retail developments consume an increasing amount of
property located within a convenient distance from where most
people work. Land prices rise as fewer convenient or "well-
located" sites remain available. 9 Additionally, as development
expands, land use regulation becomes more restrictive thereby
increasing the cost of property development." As the cost of
home ownership escalates, many people seek less expensive al-
ternatives. Since residential rent payments are generally not
deductible, the deductibility of mortgage interest payments is
another reason for the popularity of condo and co-op ownership.
In certain urban areas such as New York City, regulatory re-
strictions on rent provide an additional incentive for owners to
convert their rental properties to condo or co-op ownership."
Sociological factors have also propelled the growth of condos
and co-ops. More families today are comprised of two working
spouses.12 Additionally, people are increasingly enjoying an ar-
ray of leisure and recreational activities. Cable television, satel-
lite television, videos, the Internet, exercise, and yoga classes
satiate one's leisure hours. Today's lifestyles leave individuals
with less time and desire to address the many obligations that
accompany private home ownership. Many homeowners seek to
escape the responsibility of maintaining a home, such as care of
a lawn, exterior painting, and repairs. As medical science has
elongated life expectancy, an increasing segment of the popula-
8 See generally 1 PATRICK J. ROHAN & MELVIN A. RESKIN, CONDOMINIUM LAW &
PRACTICE §§ 1.01-.02 (1998).
9See Heather J. Wilson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Massachusetts Land Law,
11 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 839, 839 (1984) (noting that residential property is an
item few Americans can afford and that "[girowing urbanization, economic factors,
and increasing commercial demands for land may soon render the United States a'
largely 'landless' society").
10 See Linda Wintner, Note, An Argument for an Antitrust Attack on Exclusion-
ary Zoning, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 1035, 1052 (1984) ("[Z]oning can be carried out in ei-
ther of two ways: directly, by prohibiting or restricting land use, or indirectly, by
setting minimum requirements that increase costs and limit the number of potential
purchasers."); see also DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 201 (1982) (providing
a detailed examination of exclusionary zoning).
" See Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law:
Cases and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 556 (1984) ("Landlords seeking to
escape the strictures of rent control may try to convert their rental properties to
condominiums.").
12 See Anita Hattiangadi, Letter, The Overworked American?, THE CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 3, 1998, at 12, available in 1998 WL 2370385 (finding 70 per-
cent of married couple families have two working spouses).
[73:75
ALTERNATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
tion has watched their children 'qeave the nest" and they no
longer wish to be saddled with the financial and physical obliga-
tions of maintaining a large home. Additionally, some people
purchase condos or co-ops because they desire enhanced security.
Many people live in co-ops because the common co-op require-
ment that purchasers be approved by governing boards affords
them greater control over who may become their neighbors. The
fact is that the co-op and condo form of ownership has experi-
enced an immense rate of growth.
13
II. GENESIS OF OCCUPANCY CONFLICTS
Purchasers of a condo or co-op ("unit") purchase subject to
covenants, conditions, and restrictions embodied in a condo's
declaration, by-laws, and house rules or in a co-op's certificate of
incorporation, proprietary lease, by-laws, and house rules
(collectively "restrictions").4
Purchasers typically focus on a unit's location, size, configu-
ration, price, general physical condition, and their ability to fi-
nance. Unfortunately, purchasers often "gloss over" restrictions
that directly impact their private use and enjoyment of the unit
and the common areas within the building or community. Many
unit purchasers have previously lived in rental apartments or
private homes and have never experienced the types of restric-
tions imposed upon them in a condo or co-op. Accordingly, many
purchasers do not focus upon such restrictions until after they
have sold or vacated their prior residence, closed on their new
": See Rabin, supra note 11, at 536 n.94. The author noted that a study by the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development revealed that conversion of
rental housing has increased dramatically since 1970. Particularly, "in the period
1977 through 1979, 260,000 units were converted, 71 percent of the decade's total."
Id.; see also Stewart E. Sterk, Minority Protection in Residential Private Govern-
ments, 77 B.U. L. REV. 273, 276 n.11 (1997) (noting that estimates showed that in
1990, there were 4,847,921 condominium units and 82,000 cooperative units in the
United States).
14 See Louise Hickok, Note, Promulgation and Enforcement of House Rules, 48
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1132, 1132 (1974) (noting that enforcement of condo rules often
leads to litigation); see also 1 ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 8, § 3.03; Patrick J. Ro-
ban, Cooperative Housing: An Appraisal of Residential Controls and Enforcement
Procedures, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1323, 1323 (1966) (questioning whether purchasers
should be forewarned of the extent to which restrictions may deplete their rights as
individual owners); Richard Siegler, Agreements for Apartment Alterations, N.Y.
L.J., Nov. 4, 1998, at 3 (noting that restrictions on alterations to the unit are typi-
cally found in either a co-op's proprietary lease or a condo's by-laws).
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unit, and settled into their new home.' 5
Most occupancy conflicts involve quality of life or financial
issues. Common quality of life conflicts include, inter alia, dis-
putes relating to repairs, alterations, 6 leasing and subletting,
17
noise, parking facilities, ownership of pets, 8 use of units for
commercial or professional purposes, incivility, use of common
areas, and exterior decor. Common financial disputes include, in-
ter alia, failure to pay maintenance, common charges, special as-
sessments, fines or penalties, restrictions on resale or transfer,
and access to books and records. 9 Occupancy conflicts usually
involve disputes between a unit owner and an association, a unit
owner and a management agent, a unit owner and a sponsor, an
association and a contractor, or a lender and a sponsor.
Even occupants who purchased their units with knowledge
of restrictions may encounter occupancy conflicts because of hu-
man nature and the close proximity to one's neighbors. -Condo
and co-op occupants frequently interact with each other as they
enter their building's lobby, elevator, parking lot, or common rec-
reational facilities. The closer the proximity and the more fre-
quent the interaction, the greater the opportunity for personality
clashes to evolve.
Moreover, occupants who dwell under a rental regime of
ownership, generally perceive that their building is owned and
operated by people or companies with professional real estate
experience and expertise. In contrast, occupants- living under
condo or co-op regimes know that ownership and operational de-
cisions are being made by individuals who may have no profes-
5 See Armand Arabian, Condos, Cats, and CC&RS: Invasion of the Castle
Common, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 1 (1995) (noting that many new owners may be com-
pletely unaware of condo rules and regulations until they move in and discover that
they are bound by a plethora of intrusive restrictions).
6 See, e.g., Marren v. 215 E. 79th St., Inc., 614 N.Y.S.2d 104, 104 (App. Div.
1994) (finding a proprietary lease rightfully required plaintiff to request written ap-
proval from the lessor before making structural alterations).
17 See, e.g., Bailey v. 800 Grand Concourse Owners, Inc., 604 N.Y.S.2d 562, 562-
66 (App. Div. 1993) (reinstating a co-op owner's cause of action for damages stem-
ming from illegal and excessive sublet fees).
8 See Board of Managers v. Rubenstein, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 8, 1993, at 30 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Feb. 8, 1993) (holding that a local pet law aimed at rental tenants and landlords
did not apply in the context of condominium owners).
19 See In re Reisman, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 17, 1993, at 28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 17,
1993) (holding that petitioners were entitled to "unfettered unrestricted access to all
of the corporate books and records" held by a co-op board).
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sional real estate expertise or experience." When an occupant
knows that decisions involving property management are being
made by the accountant, stockbroker, professor, store owner, and
matrimonial attorney who are members of the association's gov-
erning board ("board"), occupants are often less willing to accept
and respect decisions by the board, i.e. occupants are more likely
to question judgments made by non-real estate professionals.
Occupants are also more likely to question a decision when they
know it is made by a physician or attorney rather than a profes-
sional owner. Accordingly, the self-governing nature of a condo
and co-op regime of ownership also contributes to an atmosphere
that is conducive to internal occupancy conflicts.
Given the growth of condo and co-op ownership, the close
proximity to neighbors, lack of professional ownership, human
nature, and unit owners' failure to consider occupancy restric-
tions prior to purchase, it is hardly surprising that there has
been a significant increase in occupancy conflicts. This has re-
sulted in enormous expenditures of time and money by condo
and co-op occupants and associations.2' While many disputes are
resolved through discussion and negotiation between the parties,
the record reflects a tidal wave of litigation involving condos and
co-ops over the last ten years.2 While experts may disagree as to
the proximate causes of such increased litigation, there is little
disagreement as to the magnitude of the problem. This material
20 See James L. Winokur, Critical Assessment: The Financial Role of Community
Associations, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1135, 1144 (1998) ("Association board mem-
bers are common citizens all too often lacking in training to manage the associations
for which they are responsible.").
21 See N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW Art. 23-A cmt. (McKinney Supp. 1998) (Walter D.
Goldsmith, Real Estate Financing) (discussing both the increase in volume and the
broadening range of issues); GOLDSMITH & LEEDS, NEW YORK REAL ESTATE
PRACTICE GUIDE, Vol. IV: "Cooperatives and Condominiums," Matthew Bender,
1986; see also J. Linn Allen, Rage on the Drive: Local Saga May Signal that Condo
Disputes are Growing More Vitriolic, CaH. TAIB., Oct. 11, 1998, Real Estate sec., at
1, available in 1998 WL 2904602 (noting that conflict often arises when condomin-
ium boards seek access to individual units for even routine maintenance).
22 See Winokur, supra note 20, at 1144; see also Allen, supra note 21, at 1
(quoting Charles Steinberg, Chairman of the Chicago Bar Association committee on
condominium law, who notes that the relationship between owners and boards of
condominiums have grown more acrimonious); Walter D. Goldsmith, Cooperative
and Condominium Disputes, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 21, 1994, at 3 (advocating the use of
ADR as a solution to the "explosive growth in litigations involving cooperatives and
condominiums"); Jay Romano, Mediation Instead of Litigation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15,
1998, sec. 11, at 3 (indicating that the creation of the condominium housing court
may lead to increased ADR).
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increase of condo/co-op litigation led Judith S. Kaye, Chief Judge
of the New York State Court of Appeals, to institute a pilot pro-
gram establishing special co-op/condo resolution parts of the
Housing Court.' The pilot program involves segregation of co-op
and condo cases from routine landlord-tenant cases and the as-
signment of such cases to designated judges in each county.24
Co-op organizations have opined that special parts in the
Housing Court dedicated solely to resolving disputes involving
condos and co-ops were necessary on the grounds, inter alia, that
"'[c]o-op cases are generally more intricate than typical landlord-
tenant matters' "" and often "tie up landlord-tenant courtrooms
for hours-resulting in a bottle neck for more easily resolved
cases."26  One co-op spokesperson complained that " 'housing
court judges haven't really grasped that there is a fundamental
difference between disputes in co-ops and those in rental build-
ings.... In co-ops, the tenants are also the owners. And a judge
can't just apply landlord-tenant law willy-nilly without thinking
about that difference.' " 27 The pilot program is intended "to bring
litigants to amicable settlements without the need for a trial," by
having condo and co-op matters handled by judges and court at-
torneys who have expertise in the legal, business and practical
aspects of condos and co-ops operations.2
III. APPLICABLE JUDICiAL STANDARDS
As the courts have become inundated with occupancy con-
flicts, standards governing such issues have evolved. In Levan-
dusky v. One Fifth Avenue Apartment Corp.,29 the New York
State Court of Appeals held that the actions of the board of di-
rectors should be evaluated pursuant to the business judgment
rule, which governs disputes between shareholders and corpo-
rate directors."0 In Levandusky, an occupant sought to enlarge
23 See Romano, supra note 2, at 3.
24 See id. Two court attorneys will also be appointed to assist each judge. See id.
2' Id. (quoting Allen Thurgood, executive director of the Coordinating Council of
Cooperatives).
2Id.
27 Id. (quoting Marc Luxemburg, an attorney and the president of the Council of
New York Cooperatives).
28 Id.
29 553 N.E.2d 1317 (N.Y. 1990).30 See id. at 1319.
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the kitchen area of his unit.3 ' The occupant asserted that the co-
op's architect orally approved the alterations.32 The occupant's
architect's plans required the removal and replacement of cer-
tain pipes, but these plans did not reveal that the steam riser
would be relocated.' After the co-op board approved his plans,
the board learned that the occupant intended to relocate the
steam riser. 4 The board denied the occupant permission to move
the riser, and modified its prior approval by conditioning ap-
proval on submission of an acceptable plan. The occupant never-
theless proceeded with the alterations.35 The board issued a
"stop work" order, and the occupant commenced an article 78
proceeding to have the order nullified." The New York Court of
Appeals held that the co-op board had acted in furtherance of the
purposes of the co-op, within the scope of its power, and in good
faith. Therefore, it concluded that the courts should not substi-
tute their judgment for that of the board's."
Levandusky established a three prong test. In order for
board action to be insulated from an occupant's challenge, the
board action must be undertaken: "(i) in furtherance of the pur-
poses of the co-op; (ii) within the scope of its authority; and (iii)
in good faith."" Levandusky has been perceived as a decision
that has empowered and protected co-op and condo boards. Un-
fortunately, some condo and co-op boards seem to ignore Levan-
dusky's caution that judicial review would be available to an oc-
cupant who demonstrates a "breach of fiduciary duty in the form
31 See id.
3See id. Levandusky claimed that he had told the co-op's architect that he
planned to realign a steam riser in the kitchen area. See id. The architect claimed
that Levandusky did not mention the realignment. See id.
"See id.
'1 See id.
35 See id.
88 See id. The co-op board cross-petitioned for an order requiring the occupant to
put the steam riser back in its original location. See id. The supreme court granted
the occupant's position and dismissed the counter claims. See id. On reargument the
court withdrew its decision, dismissed the occupant's petition, and granted the
board's petition. See id. at 1320. The appellate division, modifying the judgment,
reinstated the supreme court's original decision. See id. "[Tiwo Justices dissented on
the ground that the board's action was within the scope of its business judgment."
Id.
37 See id. at 1322. The court held that "unless a resident challenging the board's
action is able to demonstrate a breach of... duty, judicial review is not available."
Id.
" Richard Siegler, 'Levandusky' Updated Again, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 6, 1996, at 3
(citing Levandusky, 553 N.E.2d at 1321).
1999]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [73:75
of bad faith, acts outside the board's authority or discriminatory
acts."9 Once an occupant "demonstrates that the board's action
has no legitimate relationship to the welfare of the cooperative,
deliberately singles out individuals for harmful treatment, is
taken without notice or consideration of the relevant facts, or is
beyond the scope of the board's authority," the burden of proof
shifts back to the board.40
A large number of courts around the country have adopted a
standard of reasonableness, rather than the business judgment
rule.41 For example, a Florida court, in Hidden Harbor Estates,
Inc. v. Norman,42 held that an association may not adopt
"arbitrary or capricious rules bearing no relationship to the
health, happiness and enjoyment of life of the various unit own-
ers."43 Norman implied that the association bears the burden of
proof of demonstrating the reasonableness of a particular re-
striction.44
In Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Assn,45 the
California Supreme Court adopted a reasonableness standard
consistent with a California statutory mandate that "covenants
and restrictions in the declaration shall be enforceable equitable
servitudes, unless unreasonable." 6 The jurisdictions which apply
39 Richard Siegler, The Aftermath of 7Levandusky', N.Y. L.J., Mar. 2, 1994, at 3.
For cases applying this test, see, for example, Board of Managers v. Fairway at N.
Hills, 603 N.Y.S.2d 867, 869 (App. Div. 1993) (noting "that the members of an initial
board of managers of a condominium [owe a fiduciary duty and] must perform their
duties in 'good faith' "); New York v. Metz, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 10, 1994, at 24 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Mar. 9, 1994); Residential Bd. of Managers v. Berman, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 15, 1993,
at 22 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 14, 1993) (denying summary judgment for the board on
ground there was an issue of fact whether the board had breached its fiduciary
duty), affd, 633 N.Y.S.2d 478 (App. Div. 1995).
. Levandusky, 553 N.E.2d at 1323; see also Siegler, supra note 39, at 3
(discussing the standard used to review actions taken by condo and co-op boards).
41 See Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., Changing the Rules: Should Courts Limit the
Power of Common Interest Communities to Alter Unit Owners' Privileges in the Face
of Vested Expectations?, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1081, 1116 (1998); see also Con-
stance L. Hall, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Regulations of Governing
Body of Condominium or Cooperative Apartment Pertaining to Parking, 60
A.L.R.5TH 647 (1998) (reviewing decisions involving both standards).
42 309 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)
43 Id. at 182 ("If a rule is reasonable the association can adopt it; if not, it can-
not.").
4See Arabian, supra note 15, at 12 (noting that the court in Norman did not
specifically state which party had the burden of proof, but that the court's reasoning
indicates the burden would rest on the association).
45 878 P.2d 1275 (Cal. 1994 ) (en banc).
46 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1354(a) (Deering 1994).
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a reasonableness standard generally require that a "restriction is
'reasonably related to the association's purposes,' is reasonably
within the board's powers, is reasonable in scope, and [is]
'reasonably enacted or reasonably enforced.' , "
Regardless of the precise standard employed by various
state courts, all standards of review essentially burden the occu-
pant's ability to challenge a particular restriction or action by an
association.48 The standards reflect a presumption of validity as
to association action and have resulted in relatively few decisions
wherein association action was overturned. When an association
decision is overturned, it is often a result of a governing board
failing to adhere to its own controlling documents, i.e. the subject
action is inconsistent with a co-op's certificate of incorporation,
proprietary lease, by-laws, or house rules.49
The courts recognize that a presumption of validity is es-
sential to the orderly operation and fiscal soundness of the com-
mon interest developments. Associations could not properly
function if decisions could be "Monday morning quarterbacked"
by each individual unit owner. Moreover, absent a legal stan-
dard which affords substantial protection to officers and direc-
tors, it would be difficult to recruit unit owners to serve in posi-
tions of leadership.
Since judicial precedent generally supports the decision
making powers of associations, associations are reluctant to ne-
gotiate amicable resolutions or yield their decision making pow-
ers to an arbitration panel."° Both occupants and associations
harbor concerns about binding arbitration, because they do not
want decisions to be imposed upon them without their consent
and they know that rights of appeal from arbitration decisions
are substantially circumscribed.5 As a result of perceived in-
47 Carl B. Kress, Comment, Beyond Nahrstedt Reviewing Restrictions Govern-
ing Life in a Property Owner Association, 42 UCLA L. REV. 837, 843-44 (1995)
(describing the use of the reasonableness standard in California and other jurisdic-
tions) (quoting WAYNE S. HYATT, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION
PRACTICE: COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW § 6.02(a)(3) (2d ed. 1988)).
43 See Arabian, supra note 15, at 11-15 (explaining that under the reasonable-
ness standard of review the board's actions will be upheld unless they are found to
be arbitrary or capricious).
49 See id. at 18 (explaining that "courts are unlikely to overturn a board decision
except in extreme circumstances").
See Goldsmith, supra note 22, at 3 ("Boards may be reluctant to surrender
their substantial decision-making powers to an arbitration panel.").
6' See Scott E. Mollen, Real Estate Financing Bureau Adapts to a New Market-
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flexibility by occupancy associations, occupants often conclude
that they have no choice but to seek relief through the judicial
system.
IV. INADEQUACIES OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
The judicial system is ill suited to resolve occupancy con-
flicts. It has been said that "a picture is worth a thousand
words." 360 Owners Corp. v. Diacou,"2 provides an extremely
valuable "picture" or "window of insight." This case involved a
dispute as to whether a plaintiff co-op corporation or defendant
shareholders had the obligation to provide window guards in the
shareholders' apartment.53 The window guards were required by
the New York City Health Code."' The co-op's motion for sum-
mary judgment was granted.55 The cost of installing the window
guards was approximately $919.' 6 The co-op incurred a legal bill
of $73,547, which it sought to recover from the defendant share-
holders.57  The defendant shareholders had allegedly paid
$30,000 in legal fees to their own attorneys.58 The case was the
subject of substantial media coverage including an article in the
Wall Street Journal.59 The article described the lawsuit as "an
expensive lesson in keeping things in perspective" and quoted
one shareholder as stating: "I'm a man converted.... Anything
you can possibly do to avoid a lawsuit, do it."" The court ulti-
mately held that the co-op could recover only $30,000 of the
$73,547 fees that it incurred.6 While the foregoing example ob-
viously represents an extreme fact pattern, it is illustrative of
the general problems relating to use of the judicial forum for
resolution of occupancy conflicts.
One problem in litigating occupancy conflicts is the enor-
place, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 22, 1998, at 1 (stating that the results of a survey showed
condo and co-op owners are very concerned with board conduct which "is arbitrary,
non-responsive, unethical or illegal").
52 N.Y. L.J., Feb. 23, 1994, at 22 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 22, 1994).
W See id.
" See id.
See id.
See id.
67 See id.
68 See id.
59 See Wade Lambert, Ever Hear the One About the Lawyers and the Window
Bars?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 1994, at Al.60 Id.
61 See Diacou, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 23, 1994, at 22.
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mous court docket congestion.62 The congestion is illustrated not
only by the aforementioned Housing Court statistics, but also by
a report issued by the Rand Institute for Civil Justice, which
predicts that by the year 2020, civil cases in the federal courts
will exceed 1,000,000, criminal cases will reach approximately
900,000, and appeals will approach 325,000 cases.6 These num-
bers illustrate only a part of the story, since federal courts have
far more limited jurisdiction than state courts.
While experts may debate the accuracy of projected future
case loads, there is no doubt that dockets are heavy and growing
throughout our country. This is especially so in major urban ar-
eas. As a result, no matter how well meaning, intelligent, expe-
rienced, and fair-minded jurists may be, they often lack adequate
opportunity to assist meaningful settlement discussions. Al-
though an occupancy conflict may involve a dispute which is
paramount in an occupant's life, and the dispute is of extreme
importance to the sound operation of the condo or co-op, it may
not receive the attention it deserves. This is because judges in
major urban areas may have more than 100 matters on their
daily calendar, and are often unable to spend more than five to
fifteen minutes discussing any particular dispute.
In the few minutes allotted, the condo or co-op occupant
and/or the occupant's counsel seek to explain the background of
the conflict, the issues involved, and possible solutions. In the
same brief period of time, representatives of the co-op or condo
and/or its counsel seek to explain their perspective of the back-
ground and their views on possible resolutions. There simply is
inadequate time for meaningful discussion of the issues, review
of pertinent documents and opportunity to have meaningful dia-
logue between the parties. Moreover, this dialogue often occurs
in crowded and noisy courtrooms. Additionally, a judge may lack
specific knowledge and experience in dealing with important
principles of law, economic issues, and practical ramifications
relating to the condo-co-op context.
See George L. Priest, Private Litigants and the Court Congestion Problem, 69
B.U. L. REV. 527, 527 (1996).
63 See Jack B. Weinstein, Some Benefits and Risks of Privatization of Justice
Through ADR, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 241, 264-65 (1996) (quoting
COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, PROPOSED PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS (2d prtg. 1995)). But see id. at
265 (asserting that "the present situation suggests that claims of a litigation explo-
sion are grossly overstated").
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The salient deficiencies of the judicial process also include
substantial expense and delay.' The expense and delay is often
a direct result of not only court calendar congestion, but of ex-
tensive procedural and discovery rights and the appellate proc-
ess. Moreover, litigation often reinforces and accelerates con-
frontation and feelings of animosity between parties who have
been embroiled in personal disputes well before the conflicts
have reached the litigation stage. Parties who are fighting over
the need to take remedial action to repair water leaks or the
right to make alterations become even more entrenched and an-
gry when they are compelled to write checks for thousands of
dollars to their counsel to pursue redress through the judicial
system. Emotions reach even higher peaks when parties are
compelled to interrupt their work schedules, professional obliga-
tions, or family obligations in order to spend hours in their at-
torneys' offices drafting affidavits or preparing for depositions.
The disputants' blood pressure reaches still higher levels when
they read an adversarial deposition transcript or affidavit. With
every step forward in the judicial process, the emotional hostility
and legal bills increase materially.
As the judicial process proceeds further, many parties be-
lieve that their integrity, their honor, and their self-respect re-
quire nothing less than full engagement on the battlefield. This
is especially so once a conflict has become public. Associations
often convince themselves that it is necessary to pursue a sacred
crusade to establish precedent in order to avoid future chaos.
They perceive that compromise would unleash a torrent of addi-
tional challenges by other occupants. Similarly, an occupant
may be concerned that he or she must appear to be strong in the
eyes of his or her spouse, children, and friends.
The hostility may spiral even higher as the adversaries en-
counter each other in their five foot by five foot elevator, in their
hallways, in the lobby of their building, in their parking lots, or
at their common area recreational facilities. An occupancy con-
flict, like an infectious disease, may spread through the condo or
co-op as factions evolve. Members of the community will often
rush to support their neighbors and friends. While many neigh-
"See Priest, supra note 62, at 527 ("Most of our country's major urban courts
remain plagued by congestion. Despite the extraordinary legislative and adminis-
trative consensus for reform, no single measure has been shown consistently to re-
duce delay.").
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bors will support the association, other neighbors will support
the aggrieved occupant. The problems are further compounded
by the fact that this bitter litigation journey, in a major urban
area, may last from one to three years or longer.' Litigation
delays are especially problematic when they involve decisions
that should be made in an extremely timely manner in order to
avoid adverse consequences.
Technical rules of evidence and controlling judicial prece-
dent may also render the judicial system inappropriate for reso-
lution of occupancy conflicts. All parties may benefit from the
ability to cite hearsay evidence. Some witnesses may be reluc-
tant to testify in court and may be beyond subpoena jurisdiction.
A controlling judicial precedent may constrain a court and pre-
clude the court's ability to render a decision which adequately
considers concepts of general equity and fairness.
Additionally, the judicial process is an open public process
memorialized in records which are available to the general pub-
lic. Each detail of a dispute may be available for consumption by
local news media, other occupants, and third parties. Aspects of
individuals' personal lives may become the subject of local gossip
among friends, neighbors, relatives, business associates, com-
petitors, etc. This is especially so in a day and age when anyone
with a laptop computer may access such records by spending a
few minutes and tapping a few keys on his or her computer.
There are many consequences to public dissemination of in-
ternal conflicts." An occupant may be labeled as "litigious" and
may be rejected when he or she applies for approval by a co-op
board in another building at some future time. Today, it is
common place for parties to a prospective business transaction to
conduct background checks on their prospective business associ-
ates. Publication of internal conflicts may have material adverse
impact on the value of units in a building or development. Pub-
licity may alert real estate brokers in a community and prospec-
tive purchasers to a building's structural or operational prob-
lems. Publicity about litigation may cause prospective
See id. at 555 (using Cook County, Illinois, to illustrate trial delay caused by
court congestion).
See, e.g., Patrick M. Livingston, Note, Seattle Times v. Rhinehart,- Making
"Good Cause" a Good Standard for Limits on Dissemination of Discovered Informa-
tion, 47 U. PrTT. L. REV. 547, 558 (1986) (discussing the interest of the courts in pro-
tecting a litigant from the potential harm of the dissemination of materials regard-
ing a lawsuit).
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purchasers to become concerned as to possible future special as-
sessments or increases in maintenance to pay for the costs of
litigation.
Many people are reluctant to purchase a unit in a
"residential war zone." Publicity involving occupancy litigation
may also unleash problems with a building or development's
lender and/or insurance carriers and may even evoke action by
government agencies. For example, publication of problems re-
lating to building conditions may provoke inspections by a local
fire department or building department and lead to violations
being placed on the property. Such violations may concern in-
surers, lenders, and title companies and may require immediate
and expensive remedial action. When people come home after a
full day's work, they want their home to be a tension-free respite
from conflict. Sometimes, internal conflict is even more emo-
tionally damaging to a non-working family person since such
non-working person may be home during both the day and even-
ing and, therefore, may have more interaction with the adversar-
ies.
Further, a substantial amount of occupancy conflict litiga-
tions involve claims against governing boards for punitive and
other damages that may be excluded from an association's direc-
tors and officers insurance policy. In fact, some associations lack
directors and officers insurance. Individuals who serve on gov-
erning boards and are named as defendants in occupancy litiga-
tion, often have to disclose such litigation on their personal fi-
nancial statements.67 Such disclosure may impact their business
activities, including their ability to obtain personal credit.
The foregoing catalog of negative litigation consequences is
by no means all-inclusive. It is merely illustrative. Experienced
practitioners and jurists know that the foregoing problems occur
every day of the week and are not unusual. Although he could
not have had condos and co-ops in mind, the words of Abraham
Lincoln, in the year 1850, seem extremely relevant to today's oc-
cupancy conflict context. Mr. Lincoln wrote: "Discourage litiga-
tion. Persuade your neighbors to compromise whenever you can.
Point out to them how the nominal winner is often a real loser,
6See Vincent J. Love, Basics of Accounting and Finance: What Every Practicing
Lawyer Needs to Know, 1064 PLI/Corp. 125, at 161 (1998) (discussing the basics of
what must be reported in the note to the financial statement including litigation).
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in fees, expenses, and waste of time."" Judge Learned Hand ar-
ticulated similar concerns as to the litigation process when he
stated:
[T]he price we pay for [unrestrained advocacy], the atmosphere
of contention over trifles, the unwillingness to concede what
ought to be conceded, and to proceed to things which matter.
Courts have fallen out of repute; many of you avoid them when-
ever you can, and rightly. About trials, hang a suspicion of
trickery and a sense of result of depending upon cajolery or
worse. I wish I could say it was all unmerited. After now some
dozen years of experience, I must say that as a litigant I should
dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything else short of sickness
and death.6 9
V. LIMITED USE OF ADR TO RESOLVE CONDO/CO-OP CONFLICTS
Employment of arbitration and mediation techniques to re-
solve occupancy conflicts has generally been limited. Arbitration
clauses will occasionally appear in condominium documents in
connection with issues relating to energy consumption or dis-
putes regarding common charges. Rarely, do condo or co-op gov-
ernment documents embody mediation clauses.
Arbitration generally involves a form of adjudication in
which a neutral decision-maker renders a binding decision.70 In
private, voluntary arbitration, parties agree in advance that cer-
tain types of disputes or all disputes between parties will be ar-
bitrated. The parties agree to be bound by the arbitrator's deci-
sion.7 An arbitrator's decision may be confirmed or vacated by a
es FREDERICK TREVOR HILL, LINCOLN THE LAWYER 102 (1986) (quoting Abraham
Lincoln).
Judge Learned Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of the Mat-
ter, Address to the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (1921). While
many people think of ADR as involving arbitration or mediation, other ADR proc-
esses include those that are court ordered, such as summary jury trials, early neu-
tral evaluation and judicial settlement conferences; see also ABRAHAM P. ORDOVER,
ALTERNATIVES TO LITIGATION 4 (1993) (noting "a growing emphasis on interest-
based resolution, which "does not focus on which party is 'right' " but rather,
"[wihere successful, the case will resolve in a WIN-WIN fashion"). Voluntary forms
of ADR include negotiation, mini-trials, and rent-a-judge. See id.
70 See, e.g., DONOVAN LEISURE NEWTON & IRVINE, ADR PRACTICE BOOK § 3.1
(John H. Wilkinson ed., 1990); see also ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & DONNA STIENSTRA,
ADR AND SETTLEMENT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES
AND LAWYERS 72-308 (1996) (discussing the benefits and drawbacks of alternative
dispute resolution).
71 See id; see also IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 7 (1992).
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court.72 However, the standards for vacating arbitration awards
are extremely narrow.7 Parties who agree to private arbitration,
as contrasted with court annexed arbitration processes, have
enormous latitude in designing the arbitration process. Parties
may enter into agreements specifying procedural and substan-
tive standards to be used in the arbitration process. 74 Agree-
ments will typically provide that the arbitrator shall be selected
either by the parties, by a dispute resolution organization such
as the American Arbitration Association, or by a combination
thereof. Some agreements call for arbitrators to be selected by a
court. Agreements may also specify the qualifications of the ar-
bitrator. Arbitration procedures permit presentation of wit-
nesses and documents, cross-examination, and arguments to ar-
bitrators. 75  However, arbitration typically embodies procedural
rules which are less formal than the procedural rules used in
72 See MACNEIL, supra note 71, at 7; see also Stephen H. Kupperman & George
C. Freeman, Selected Topics in Securities Arbitration: Rule 15c2-2, Fraud, Duress,
Unconscionability, Waiver, Class Arbitration, Punitive Damages, Rights of Review,
and Attorneys' Fees and Costs, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1547, 1608-32 (1991) (describing the
standards for confirming and vacating arbitration awards).
' See MACNEIL, supra note 71, at 7 (stating "the arbitrator's decision is[ ] sub-
ject to very limited grounds of review") (emphasis added); DONOVAN LEIsURE
NEWTON & IRVINE, supra note 70, § 3.35 (listing such grounds as "fraud, arbitrator
collusion, partiality or bias and failure to review material evidence"); Kupperman &
Freeman, supra note 72, at 1609 (" '[Only clear evidence of impropriety... justifies
the denial of summary confirmation of an arbitration award.' ") (quoting Ormsbee
Dev. Co. v. Grace, 668 F.2d 1140, 1147 (10th Cir. 1982)); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. art.
75 (McKinney 1998) (governing arbitration in New York).
74 See ORDOVER, supra note 69, at 114 (noting that the parties "can control such
details as how arbitration will be invoked, whether the arbitrator's award will be
advisory or binding, whether witnesses will be called and placed under oath,
whether briefs will be submitted, and whether the record will remain open after the
hearing for the receipt of new evidence"); see also 0. Thomas Johnson, Jr., Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution in the International Context: The North American Free
Trade Agreement, 46 SMU L. REV. 2175, 2186 (1993) (discussing ways in which par-
ties can agree to different procedural aspects of arbitration, specifically the use of
panel arbiters).
76 See ORDOVER, supra note 69, at 108 ("Ordinarily, most or all of the arbitra-
tor's knowledge and understanding of a case is based upon evidence and arguments
presented at the arbitration hearing."); see also Marianne Roth, False Testimony in
International Commercial Arbitration: A Comparative View, 7 N.Y. INTL L. REV.
147, 151 (1994) (discussing implications such as criminal liability for false testimony
at international arbitration proceedings); John R. Van Winkle, An Analysis of the
Arbitration Rule of the Indiana Rules of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 27 IND. L.
REV. 735, 748-51 (1994) (discussing the aspects of evidence and witnesses in arbi-
tration proceedings).
ALTERNATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
litigation.7"
In response to court congestion and in an attempt to achieve
enhanced satisfaction with the judicial process, courts have in-
creasingly turned to court annexed arbitration programs. In a
court annexed arbitration process, parties are not bound by the
decision of the arbitrators and retain a right to a trial de novo.77
One of the main reasons parties select arbitration is because of
the finality of the decision, and limited judicial review.7 Since
there are procedural differences between arbitration and trials,
it is often unlikely that the same result would be reached in arbi-
tration as in a trial on the same matter.79 Additionally, since
arbitration is often used to avoid court congestion, it would be
self-defeating to have the courts review every arbitration deci-
sion. Thus, review is limited to a de novo review which is only
used in circumstances where a gross error occurred in the arbi-
tration, such as fraud or arbitrator collusion."0
In mediation, a neutral third party assists the parties to re-
solve a dispute.8 ' In contrast to an arbitrator, judge, or jury, a
mediator does not have authority to impose a solution.82 The
parties may, upon mutual consent, ask a mediator to function as
an arbitrator by rendering a binding decision.' Mediation has
been the "dominant method of processing disputes in some quar-
ters of the world."' This is particularly true in parts of Asia,
where litigation is seen as "a shameful last resort."'
As with arbitration, the mediation process has countless
variations and requires that the parties agree to participate.
76 See ORDOVER, supra note 69, at 11 ("Procedure for an arbitration is usually
much less formal than at a trial.").
77 See id. at 109.
7" See ORDOVER, supra note 69, at 126 ("One of the primary benefits attributed
to traditional arbitration is its finality. Once an award is made it may be subjected
to only limited additional review, in court or otherwise.").
7" See id. at 27.See supra note 73 (discussing the limited review of arbitration awards).
8' See DONOVAN LEISURE NEWTON & IRVINE, supra note 70, § 7.2 ("The process
focuses on getting each party's cards out on the table and seeing which cards match
to produce a settlement, rather than having a third party decide how the matter will
be resolved.").
2See id. § 7.4.; see also ORDOVER, supra note 69, at 13 (stating a party may
employ mixed ADR processes such as mediation and arbitration).
"See ORDOVER, supra note 69, at 13 (explaining med/arb in which the mediator
can, by contract, act as the arbitrator if the mediation is unsuccessful).
'A Leonard L. Risldn, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 29 (1982).
85 Id.
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However, most mediation processes involve employment of a
neutral party who performs certain functions. Such functions
include: encouraging the participants to communicate; assisting
participants in understanding the mediation process; conveying
messages between participants; helping participants to set an
agenda; providing an appropriate environment for negotiation;
maintaining order; assisting the participants in understanding
the issues; helping to defuse unrealistic expectations; assisting
participants in developing their own proposals, and; assisting
participants in their negotiations and in fashioning a settlement
that is acceptable to each party.88 Perhaps the most significant
benefit to be derived from mediation is that it strives for a reso-
lution that is voluntarily arrived at by the parties. Experts be-
lieve that parties are more likely to be satisfied with the process
and the result and, therefore, more likely to adhere to their ul-
timate agreement, if the agreement is a result of their own crea-
tion. 7
A typical mediation process begins with introductory re-
marks by a mediator. These remarks are designed to explain the
process, state the ground rules, ensure that there are no conflicts
of interest with the mediator, and establish realistic expectations
of the process and the parties' commitment to pursue an amica-
ble result. The mediator then encourages the parties to state
their perception of the problem." The process then moves to the
information stage where the parties discuss the important is-
sues.89
See generally Leonard L. Riskin, The Special Place of Mediation in Alternative
Dispute Processing, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 19 (1985) (describing the goals of mediation).
See Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims
Court: Achieving Compliance Through Consent, 18 L. & SOC'Y REV. 11, 40-47 (1984)
(discussing the "social psychology of consent" and asserting that the parties' satis-
faction with an agreement depend on personal values and idiosyncrasies).
88 See Ellen A. Waldman, The Evaluative-Facilitative Debate in Mediation: Ap-
plying the Lens of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 155, 161-62 (1998)
(explaining the introductory stage of the mediation process, which encourages the
parties to describe the dispute from their own perspectives without interference
from any counsel that may be present); see also L. Randolph Lowry, Preparing Your
Client for Mediation, DisP. RESOL. J., Aug. 1998, at 30, 30-36 (noting that the me-
diation process, in contrast to the adversarial system, allows parties to emotionally
express their view of the conflict which increases the chance of settlement because
of the lack of lingering resentment); Jeffrey Krivis, ADR and Suspected Fraudulent
Claims, DIsP. RESOL. J., Aug. 1998, at 20, 20-24 (noting that while parties are ex-
plaining their views there are no interruptions by the adversary).
See Bill Minich, Ensuring that the Programs Succeeds: Employment ADR How
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One of the most attractive aspects of a mediation process is
that it affords parties the opportunity to discuss the matter not
only with each other, but also in a separate caucus with the me-
diator. Mediators help the parties to respond to accusations and
clarify misunderstandings. The parties, with the help of the
mediator, then explore all possible options for resolving the dis-
pute. Hopefully, the mediator may then assist the parties in
preparing a writing that embodies an enforceable settlement
agreement. The selection of a neutral party who is a skilled and
trained mediator, and who is respected by both sides, is essential
to a successful mediation process. In many cases, the respect
each party has for the neutral party is a pivotal factor in the ad-
versaries' willingness to enter into the mediation process.
Among the important aspects of the mediation process is a
pre-condition for an agreement of confidentiality." Such agree-
ments usually provide, at a minimum, that no statements made
in the course of mediation will be admissible in any other action
or proceeding and that the mediator may not be called as a wit-
ness by either party.9' Another attractive aspect of the media-
tion process is that each party usually retains the right to termi-
nate the mediation at any point. 2 Thus, unlike arbitration and
To's, DISP. RESOL. J., Aug. 1998, at 58, 58-59 (explaining that the mediator will help
parties see both the strengths and weaknesses of their positions and through nego-
tiations try to seek a fair settlement).
" See Krivis, supra note 88, at 23-24 (observing that the secure environment of
mediation allows parties to fully explore their adversaries position before commit-
ting themselves to an unfair settlement).
91 See Krivis, supra note 88, at 24 (reasoning that the confidential aspect of
mediation will increase the probability of settlements because parties are at ease
during the negotiations); Rodney A. Max, Mediation Comes of Age in Alabama, 59
ALA. LAW. 239, 240 (1998) (explaining that the parties, attorneys, and the mediator
will never be allowed to divulge any statements uttered or positions or actions taken
during mediation process unless the confidentiality requirement is waived); see also
Tom Arnold, Why is ADR the Answer?, 15 COMPUTER LAW. 13, 13-18 (1998) (arguing
that the parties have the full control over a mediation because they judge the facts
and the law in addition to having the freedom to walk away); Waldman, supra note
88, at 162 (noting that another pre-condition is that participants treat each other
with respect during the negotiations).
s See Robert D. Benjamin, A Critique of Mediation-Challenging Misconceptions,
Assessing Risks and Weighing Advantages, 146 PITT. LEGAL J. 37, 38 (1998) (ex-
plaining that the mediation process must be voluntary to hold any integrity and
must therefore allow parties to withdraw at anytime without any consequence or
sanctions); see also Cecilia G. Morris, Guidelines for Mediation of an Attorney Fee
Dispute, in AvoIDING LEGAL MALPRACTICE 1998, at 1053, 1056-57 (PLI Litig. &
Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. HO-OOB, 1998) (reporting that the
final report of the chief judge of the New York State Alternative Dispute Resolution
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litigation, the ultimate decision can be made only by the partici-
pants themselves. It is often said that in mediation, the parties
"own" the process. Additionally, if the mediation process fails,
the parties retain their right to pursue relief, either through ar-
bitration, if there is an arbitration agreement, or through litiga-
tion. As some attorneys explain to their clients, they retain the
right to "hemorrhage" legal fees and to allow the result to be fi-
nally determined by an arbitrator, judge or jury who may lack
particular subject matter expertise and may not have the oppor-
tunity to truly understand the parties' concerns and positions.9 3
Further, the informality of mediation often minimizes the in-
vestment of attorney time and accompanying costs. Moreover,
the nature of the mediation process minimizes hostility and
animosity and is especially helpful to parties who want to con-
tinue their relationship with their adversary.' Given the inher-
ent flexibility and advantages of mediation, it is not surprising
that the American Arbitration Association has reported a success
rate of 75%-90% in the mediations which it conducts.95
For all of the foregoing reasons, several jurisdictions require,
or are considering requiring, that mandatory arbitration and
mediation clauses be incorporated into condo and co-op govern-
ance documents.96 Florida has enacted legislation which requires
Project instructs mediators to terminate the proceedings if participants are unwill-
ing to participate and agreement is unlikely to occur).
9See Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Lawyers, Clients, and Mediation, 73 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1369, 1371 (1998) (noting that parties will decide for themselves the
outcome of the dispute during mediation because the focus of the mediation is the
interaction of human relationships rather than technical and inflexible legal rules);
Ira B. Lobel, What Mediation Can & Cannot Do, DISP. RESOL. J., May 1998, at 44,
44 (describing the role of the mediator as simply to establish an environment in
which the parties can work together to solve their dispute); Steven R. Wirth & Jo-
seph P. Mitchell, Note, A Uniform Structural Basis for Nationwide Authorization of
Bankruptcy Court Annexed Mediation, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 213, 216 (1998)
(explaining that mediators will elicit solutions from each party and may, if neces-
sary, caucus with each party separately to encourage discussions and solutions).
See Richard Siegler, Alternative Dispute Resolution, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 3. 1997,
at 3 (explaining that a mediator in contrast to a judge can decide a dispute based
upon his or her own personal knowledge and can be selected by the parties for that
reason).
95 See Carolyn M. Penna, Mediation: In the Mainstream?, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 4,
1993, at 3; see also Lowry, supra note 88, at 81 (reporting that 81% of 528 of the
largest American corporations prefer mediation to litigation).
9See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.112(k) (West Supp. 1997) (mandating a pro-
vision in the by-laws for nonbinding arbitration); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 514A-
121(a) (Michie 1998 & Supp. 1998) (requiring any dispute as to the condominium by-
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that individuals initially attempt to resolve condo and co-op dis-
putes before initiating litigation.97 The Division of Florida Land
Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes ("Division") is man-
dated by the legislature to employ full-time attorneys to serve as
arbitrators to conduct arbitration hearings." Florida legislation
mandates that prior to the institution of litigation, parties to an
occupancy conflict must petition the Division for non-binding
arbitration.99 Additionally, New Jersey now mandates that as-
sociations provide an alternative procedure to litigation, to re-
solve disputes involving unit owners."' To date, New York has
not enacted any legislation which requires use of ADR by asso-
ciations. Therefore, in New York, occupancy conflicts may only
be submitted to arbitration or mediation upon consent of each
party.1 Of course, if an occupancy conflict proceeds to litigation,
it may become subject to a court annexed ADR program. The
Real Estate Financing Bureau of the New York State Attorney
General's Office is currently studying the ways that ADR might
be employed in the condo/co-op context. 2
laws to be submitted to arbitration); RAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4211-9 (Michie 1988)
(requiring dispute of cooperative by-laws to be submitted to mediation). Some states
provide the association with the discretion to include such clauses within the gov-
erning documents. See, e.g., 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 605/32-(a) (West Supp. 1998)
("The declaration or by laws of a condominium association may require mediation or
arbitration of disputes in which the matter in controversy has either no specific
monetary value or a value of $10,000 or less"); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.837(4)
(Michie Supp. 1996) (stating that "[t]he master deed may provide... [a] procedure
for submitting the disputes arising from the administration of the condominium to
arbitration or other impartial determination"); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 183A §§ 12(a),
(b) (Law. Co-op. 1996) (permitting the by-laws to provide for arbitration to deter-
mine the fair market value of a condominium unit and to resolve "disputes arising
from the administration of the condominium").
97 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.1255 (West Supp. 1999). The Legislature was con-
cerned that unit owners were at a financial disadvantage in litigation against an as-
sociation. See id. at § 718.1225(3)(d). Arbitration helps to balance the scales. See id.
at § 718.1225(3)(d).
03 See id. at § 718.1255(4) (providing that the decision of the arbitrator will not
preclude a party from filing a suit).
9See id. at § 718.1255(4)(a).
'0 See Richard E. Kennedy & Mark D. Imbriani, The Rights of Tenants in Con-
dominium and Homeowner Association Communities, N.J. LAW., Jan./Feb. 1998, at
18, 19.
101 See Siegler, supra note 94, at 3 (explaining the Civil Practice Law and Rules
of New York State which mandate that in order for a shareholder or unit owner to
be bound in arbitration, a cooperative's proprietary lease or a condominium's by-
laws must contain an arbitration clause).
0 See Scott E. Mollen, Real Estate Financing Bureau Adapts to New Market-
place, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 22, 1998, at 1 (explaining the Bureau's proposal to be submit-
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Where there is no statutory or other regulatory requirement
that ADR be employed to assist resolution of occupancy conflicts,
co-op and condo governing documents have to be amended
through the requisite voting process if associations elect to em-
ploy a mandatory ADR process.1 13  An interesting issue is
whether an occupant who abstains or votes against an amend-
ment would be bound to comply with a validly enacted arbitra-
tion procedure. As one expert has observed, there is no case law
which indicates whether a compulsory arbitration provision
would be enforceable against a dissenting unit owner.'O° An as-
sociation could argue that a unit owner is bound to comply with
the organization's governing documents, including provisions
which permit amendment thereto."5 A dissenting shareholder
might argue that redress to the judicial system is a fundamental
right that cannot be eliminated absent a unit owner's consent.
As previously observed, given the presumption of validity
that is generally accorded to association action in the judicial
process, 10 associations are often reluctant to concede any
authority to a mediator or an arbitrator. If, however, associa-
tions employ mediation to address occupancy conflicts, they
would be able to avoid the significant deficiencies of the litigation
process, while retaining their right to seek redress in the judicial
system if an amicable resolution cannot be attained in the me-
diation process. If associations consider employing a mediation
process, there are many alternative structures that would facili-
tate timely, cost effective, and amicable resolutions of occupancy
ted to the condominium task force which includes amending the regulations to re-
quire disclosure of procedures for resolving disputes or having the Bureau initiate
ADR procedures).
1 See Goldsmith, supra note 22, at 3 (opining that although an amendment to
any governing document in a co-op or condo to include a mediation clause would re-
quire a majority of the owners, it is not inconceivable to implement such a clause
through board additions to house rules).
"io See Siegler, supra note 94, at 3 (suggesting that a unit owner can be deemed
a member of an organization that is bound by governing documents).
'05 See Willard Alexander, Inc. v. Glasser, 290 N.E.2d 813, 814 (N.Y. 1972)
(concluding that the unit owner was bound to the arbitration provisions because he
agreed to be bound by the organization's by-laws).
'06 See Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apt. Corp., 553 N.E.2d 1317, 1321 (N.Y.
1972) (applying the business judgment rule to board actions which will not override
a board's judgment if there is no breach of its fiduciary duty); see also Stewart E.
Sterk, Minority Protection in Residential Private Governments, 77 B.U. L. REV. 273,
310 (1997) (noting that the business judgment rule reduces cautious risk taking be-
cause of the mitigation of liability).
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conflicts. Associations could utilize a panel of mediators com-
prised of unit owners and members of governing boards. 7 Since
parties may feel uncomfortable discussing their problems with
their neighbors, associations may employ private organizations
which provide for alternate dispute resolution services, such as
the American Arbitration Association, JAMS/Endispute, Na-
tional Arbitration & Mediation, or the mediation services of local
bar associations. Alternate dispute resolution in the co-op and
condo context is at its embryonic stage. However, the potential
benefits to be derived from the utilization of ADR procedures in
the condo-co-op context are monumental.
VI. CONCLUSION
The unique environment encountered by cooperative and
condominium residents enhances the likelihood that disputes
will arise involving neighbors, governing boards, and third par-
ties. If an occupant seeks to resolve a dispute through litigation,
he or she will risk publicity, incur high costs, experience sub-
stantial delay, and have to overcome the presumption of validity
accorded to board actions. If an association seeks to resolve oc-
cupancy conflicts through litigation, it is likely to incur, inter
alia, significant expense, publicity, delay, and disharmony within
its constituency. Accordingly, it is often preferable to resolve
these disputes through alternative dispute resolution.
ADR clauses incorporated into the governing documents of
cooperatives or condominiums should structure a rapid, inex-
pensive, fair, and effective resolution process.0 " They should en-
courage communication between the parties by requiring a good
faith attempt to negotiate. If negotiations fail, such clauses
should provide the parties with the opportunity to initiate a
mediation process. There should be a provision that if mediation
is unsuccessful, the parties may proceed to binding arbitration or
litigation.
A well drafted ADR clause should establish a process which
107 See Siegler, supra note 94, at 3 (noting that this comprised group would have
insight into the living environment, but one drawback is that persons may not feel
comfortable airing their problems in front of neighbors).
1 See, e.g., STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION,
MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 483-86 (2d ed. 1992); ARBITRATION, MEDIATION,
AND OTHER ADR METHODS 220 (ALI-ABA Course Study Materials 1993-94)
(providing examples of ADR clauses).
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reduces the kind of hostility that permeates the litigation proc-
ess. The reduction of hostility is especially important and bene-
ficial when adversaries live a "few doors apart," interact on a
daily basis and will have a continuing relationship for an ex-
tended period of time. Moreover, expanded employment of ADR
processes will benefit the public at large by reducing judicial "log
jam."
Chief Justice Berger opined that "[flor some disputes, trials
will be the only means, but for many claims, trials by adversarial
contest must in time go the way of the ancient trial by battle and
blood. Our system is too costly, too painful, too destructive, too
inefficient for a truly civilized people."'0 9 Similar observations
have been proffered by Derek Bok, the former president of Har-
vard University. Mr. Bok noted that "most people find their le-
gal rights severely compromised by the cost of legal services, the
baffling complications of existing rules and procedures, and the
long and frustrating delays involved in bringing proceedings to a
conclusion."' ° While neither Justice Burger nor Mr. Bok specifi-
cally referred to occupancy conflicts, their comments are de-
scriptive and clearly applicable to the problems which pervade
occupancy litigation. While ADR is not a panacea for such prob-
lems, it can provide substantial succor.
1'0 Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Mid-Year Meeting of ABA, 52 U.S.L.W.
2471, 2471 (U.S. Feb. 28, 1984).
110 Derek Bok, Law and Its Discontents: A Critical Look at Our Legal System, 38
REC. A.B. CITY N.Y., at 12-13 (1983).
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